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NEW MEXICO'S ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE LAW OF UNDERGROUND WATER
CHARLES D. HARRIS, of The Roswell, New Mexico Bar

As I see it, the principle guiding the western lawmakers is
how best to utilize our water resources and at the same time give
a reasonable protection to those who have property rights based
upon the use of water. In addition to the protection afforded the
water user, the community and the state also have an interest
in the most efficient use of water. Whereas the landowner may be
concerned with the problem of getting sufficient water for this
year's crop and for crops for the next few years, the community
and the state should be vitally interested in what will happen to
our irrigation economy 50 or 100 years hence.
The New Mexico ground water law, together with its administration, are of particular interest for all those concerned with
the ground water problem in the West. As was pointed out in the report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission,' "New
Mexico, while not the first state to enact ground water legislation,
has pioneered in this field in that its ground water administrative
statute, after having been declared unconstitutional and subsequently re-enacted in correct form, was the first of the western state
ground water statutes to be put into active operation and has set
the pattern for much of the subsequent legislation in that field in
the West." This is one field of law where the New Mexico lawyer
cannot go to other jurisdictions to get court decisions to uphold
his contention. With 21 years of experience under the 1931 ground
water code, New Mexico has as many court decisions on ground
water as any other state.
The first New Mexico statute, enacted in 1927, was declared
invalid by the New Mexico Supreme Court in the celebrated case
of Yeo v. Tweedy.2 While the court held the statute invalid because
it violated a constitutional prohibition against legislation by mere
reference to pre-existing legislation, the Court went on to hold that
the statute, while objectionable in form, was declaratory of existing law, was not subversive of vested rights of owners of lands
overlying the waters of an artesian basin, the boundaries of which
have been ascertained, and that the statute was fundamentally
sound. In arriving at the decision in this case, the Court stated:
We are here considering artesian basins, reservoirs
or lakes, the boundaries of which may be reasonably ascertained by surface investigations or surface indications.
Such boundaries of subterranean waters are the principal
'The Report of the President's Water Resources Policy Commission, Water
Resources Law, 1950, Vol. 3, p. 746.
234 NM 611, 286 Pac. 970 (1930).
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resources of the localities where they occur. Their employment to the best economy advantage is important to
the state. According to the correlative rights doctrine,
each overlying owner would have the same right-the
right to use whatever he saw fit. The right does not arise
from an appropriation to beneficial use, which develops
the resources of the state; it is not lost nor impaired by
non-use. Regardless of the improvements and investments
of the pioneers, later-comers or later-developers may claim
their rights. The exercise of those rights which have been
in abeyance will frequently destroy or impair existing improvements and may so reduce the rights of all that none
are longer of practical value and that the whole district
is reduced to a condition of non-productiveness. The preventive for such unfortunate and uneconomic results is
found in the recognition of the superior rights of prior
appropriators. Invested capital and improvements are thus
protected. New appropriations may thus be made only
from supply not already in beneficial use. Non-use involves
forfeiture. A great natural public resource is thus both
utilized and conserved.
At the 1931 session the present law was enacted. 3 The pertinent statutes are short and to the point and are contained in
three pages of the Annotated Statutes. Section 77-1101, provides
that bodies of ground water with reasonable ascertainable boundaries belong to the public and are subject to appropriation. The following section states: "Beneficial use is the basis, the measure and
the limit to the right to the use of the water described in this
action." The statute goes on to provide: "Existing water rights
based upon application to beneficial use are hereby recognized."
There was also a provision for forfeiture of rights after four
years' non-use. The administrative provisions of the act provide
that an applicant for a permit to appropriate must apply to the
State Engineer and that the State Engineer should cause to be
published a notice of such application in order that the public and
prior appropriators will be advised. Protestants have an opportunity to file objections and in such event the State Engineer conducts a hearing. Whether any protests have been filed or not, the
State Engineer shall grant the application unless he finds that
there is no unappropriated water or that the appropriation will
impair existing rights. Under the law as it has been administered
all appropriations, changes of water rights, changes of method of
use and changes in location or construction of the well are allowed
only after application to and permit from the State Engineer. By
this method the State has in one office all records affecting the
method and use of underground waters.
Until 1949, the State was hampered in its administration of
'New Mexico Lairs, 1931, 131 Stats. 1941 Ann. § § 77-1101 to 77-111.
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ground water law since there was no prohibition upon the well
drillers as such. Before 1949, an unscrupulous landowner could
drill or have drilled illegal wells and in the absence of a large
police force, the State and the prior appropriators had no effective
way to check on violators. The 1949 session of the Legislature
passed a well drillers law which provided that well drillers drilling
in the basins with ascertainable boundaries must have a license
issued by the State Engineer and post a bond with that official
in the sum of $5,000.00. 4 This law made it unlawful for an owner
to permit drilling except by a licensed driller and by rules and regulations the State Engineer has prohibited the well driller from
drilling unless the landowner has a permit issued by the State Engineer. This statute has proved to be of immeasurable value in
curbing illegal drilling.
For almost 20 years after the passage of the ground water
law of New Mexico, there was no serious court challenge to its
constitutionality. But in 1949 the entire act was again challenged
in the case of State v. DorityA The defendants claimed that they
acquired title to their land through patents from the United States
Government, that said patents did not reserve the water and that,
therefore, the defendants were owners of the land and the water
underlying the land conveyed. However, the Court held that since
the passage of the Desert Land Act of 1877, Federal patents of
land did not carry with them any title to the water. The Court
stated:
The Desert Land Act provided that all waters upon
the public lands except navigable waters were to remain
free for the appropriation and use of the public. It was
not intended to be taken literally that such water must
be upon the surface of the earth to be of such use. The
waters of underground rivers with defined banks have
always been subject to appropriation. We conclude that
all water that may be used for irrigation was reserved
by the Desert Land Act to be used beneficially by the public as provided by the laws of the arid states. No interest
in such waters was conveyed by United States patent.
The United States Supreme Court has always looked to
the laws and decisions of the state courts to determine the
extent to which the authority of the state over such water
has been exercised.
The Court also stated, "No right to the use of water from such
sources was obtained by its use by defendants in violation of law
nor can it be. The statutory method of securing such rights is
exclusive."
This has been a short summary of the ground water law in
New Mexico as set out in the cases and statutes. However, because
"New Mexico Laws, 1949, Ch. 178; Stats. 1949 Ann. § § 77-1116 to 77-1121.
55 N.M. 12, 232 Pac. 2d 140.
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of the fact that ground water law is of recent origin, there are
many problems facing the water administrators for which there
are little or no precedents in the cases or statutes. The first question that comes to mind in New Mexico is the status of underground waters which are not within basins as declared by the
State Engineer. The State Engineer in New Mexico has declared
certain areas as underground water basins. In many of these cases
the boundaries as declared by the State Engineer have not been
the same as the geological or hydrological boundaries of such
basins. What is the property status of such waters that are within
the hydrologic boundaries but are without the boundaries as declared by the State Engineer? In New Mexico we have assumed
that such waters belong to the public and are subject to appropriation but since the State Engineer has not assumed jurisdiction,
the statutory method of appropriation does not apply. This proposition is inferred in the two cases of Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District v. Peters.6 In this instance the defendant, Peters,
drilled a well within the hydrologic boundaries of the Roswell
Artesian Basin but outside the boundaries of the basin as declared
by the State Engineer. The defendant did not apply for a permit
under the statutory provisions of Section 77-1103. After the well
was drilled the Pecos Valley Artesian Conservancy District brought
suit to enjoin the use of the well. At the first hearing before the
New Mexico Supreme Court, the Court held that the Conservancy
District was a proper party plaintiff and sent the case back to the
District Court for a new trial. On appeal from the second trial the
New Mexico Supreme Court held that the burden of proof was
upon the Conservancy District to establish the amount of water
which owners of wells, existing at the time the Peters well tapped
the basin were legally entitled to use.
The Court went on to hold for the defendant on the grounds
that the plaintiff had not made a prima facie case. Two years later
the same court held in the Dority case 7 that rights to the use of
waters from such sources were not obtained by its use by defendants in violation of law nor can it be. The statutory method of
securing such rights is exclusive. Yet in the Peters case it was
conceded that the waters in question were public waters within
reasonably ascertainable boundaries and it was also conceded that
the defendants had not followed the statutory method of securing
such rights. In the Peters case the Court did not discuss whether
the defendant could acquire rights to appropriate public waters
without following the statutory procedure. The only distinction
between the Peters case and the Dority case is that the lands
involved in the latter case were within a basin as declared by the
State Engineer. Even though there is nothing in the statutes which
gives the State Engineer authority to declare underground basins,
it must be inferred that until the State Engineer assumes juris6

50 NM 165, 173 Pac. 2d 490 (1945); 52 NM 148, 193 Pac. 2d 418 (1948).
7ob. cit.
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diction, the appropriator is not required to follow statutory procedure and may appropriate water by application to beneficial use.
Property status of other ground water within the State is also
open to question from a strictly scientific point of view. I understand that any water found under the surface of the land must
be in some sort of basin. If this concept were followed, then for
all practical purposes all the waters in New Mexico would be
owned by the public. In Yeo v. Tweedy, 8 the Court held that the
statutes were merely declaratory of existing law insofar as waters
in basins with reasonably ascertainable boundaries. If such waters
have always belonged to the public, it would be just as reasonable
to assume that all waters in the State belong to the public.
In the Dority case, 9 the Court said, "The Desert Land Act
provided that all waters upon the public lands were to remain free
for appropriation and use of the public. We conclude that all
water that may be used for irrigation was reserved by the Desert
Land Act to be used beneficially by the public as provided by the
laws of the arid states." From this dicta it may be concluded the
Desert Land Act included all waters of the State.
The contrary view was expressed in the early case of Vanderwork v. Hughes.' The water controversy in that case was called
seepage water or spring water from unknown sources. The Court
held that the waters were not subject to statutory appropriation
and that the territorial engineer's jurisdiction was limited to the
public unappropriated waters named in the statute and did not
relate to waters held in private ownership. From this decision
it can be inferred that it is still possible to have private ownership
of water in New Mexico. In Hutchins' book on water rights in the
West,'1 he states with reference to New Mexico, "There appears
to be little basis for assuming that the rule of absolute ownership
of such other percolating water has been changed." In the writer's
opinion, all water within the State are public waters and are subject to appropriation.
Another related problem is the status of ground waters that
constitute part of the base flow or are tributary to a surface stream.
In Colorado, in the case of Nevins v. Smith 12 and Comstock v.
Ramsey 13 the Supreme Court of that state established the doctrine
that rights to the use of ground water tributary to a water course
are correlated with the right to the use of waters flowing in the
water course itself. The doctrine of prior appropriation governs
these several rights. This means that the first appropriator,
9

Ob. cit.

0b. cit.

1015

NM 439, 110 Pac. 567 (1910).

1'Selected Problems in the Law of Water Rights in the West, Miscellaneous
Publication No. 418 of U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, p. 237.
1286 Colo. 178, 279 Pac. 44 (1929).
" 55 Colo. 244, 133 Pac. 1107.
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whether he diverts from the stream itself or whether he intercepts
tributary ground water on its way to the stream, has the first
right and subsequent appropriators, whether they intercept the
ground water or divert from the surface stream, are junior in
order of priority. In other words, in the logical application of this
rule, the location of the point of diversion has no more bearing
upon the priority of tributary ground water than it has in the
case of priorities among appropriators who divert directly from
the stream.
The State Engineer of New Mexico has evidently adopted this
theory of correlation of surface and ground water insofar as the
waters of the Carlsbad Underground Basin are concerned. 1 4 In
that area he has closed the basin to further appropriation except
to owners of watei rights to the waters of the Pecos River who
may obtain permits to supplement their surface rights with ground
water. The rationale of this procedure is based upon the idea that
these waters are part of the base flow of the Pecos River and that
all of the water of the Pecos River has been appropriated.
The only New Mexico decision touching upon the inter-relationship between ground and surface water was in the case of the
El Paso and Rock Island Railroad Company v. District Court of
the Fifth Judicial District.15 The railway company instituted suit
in Lincoln County. In their complaint they set up their water
rights, alleged their validity and prayed for a general adjudication
of all water rights in the Benito stream system. The adjudication
suit was instituted under the New Mexico Adjudication Statute 16
which provided that "in any suit for the determination of a right
to use the water of any stream system, all those whose claim to
the use of such water is of record and all other claimants as can
be ascertained with reasonable diligence shall be made parties." This
section also provides "the court in which any suit involving adjudication of water rights may be properly brought shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions necessary
for the adjudication of all water rights within the stream system
involved."
During the pendency of the adjudication suit in Lincoln County,
appropriators from the Roswell Artesian Basin sought to enjoin
the railroad company's diversion of water on the grounds that
the surface waters that the railroad company was appropriating
were subversive of the superior rights of the artesian appropriators and that the surface waters of the Benito watershed contributed to the recharge of the Roswell Artesian Basin. The Supreme Court of New Mexico issued a Writ of Prohibition against
14

Manual of Rules and Regulations Governing the Drilling of Wells and the

Appropriation and Use of Underground Waters in Declared Basins of the State
of New Mexico (1951), Sec. IX, § F, p. 29.
36 NM 94, 8 Pac. 2d 1064.
"Laws of 1919, Ch. 131 § 3 amending Laws of 1917, Ch. 31 § 1.
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the Chaves County District Court on the grounds that the Lincoln
County District Court had exclusive jurisdiction over the adjudication of the stream system of Benito River and that the Roswell
Artesian Basin appropriators were proper parties to that adjudication suit since they claimed some right in the water involved.
Since the Lincoln County court had exclusive jurisdiction and the
artesian appropriators were proper parties, the Chaves County
court was without jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief.
Along the valley fill of the Rio Grande there is a considerable
amount of underground water that may be obtained. In 1948,
about 15,000 acre feet of water was pumped for municipal and
industrial use. Records show that there has been little lowering
of water levels and that pumping has not reduced significantly
the flood plain evapo-transpiration losses. Unless the pumped water
is salvaged from that waste, it is inevitable that the flow of the
river must be depleted. 17 The conclusions of a study conducted by
the United States Geological Survey in the Elephant Butte district are: "The ground water and surface water supplies are interdependent and ground water pumped in the Rincon and Mesilla
valleys does not represent an additional supply or new source of
water but rather a change in method, time and place of diversion
of the supplies already utilized." Is As is pointed out, all of the
pumping of the lower Rio Grande comes from ground water that
is a part of the base flow of the Rio Grande. No ground water
basin along the Rio Grande has been declared by the State Engineer. Most of the wells that have been drilled into the valley fill
have been used to supplement Rio Grande surface water. A question that may be the basis for future court battles is the status
of the water rights of the appropriators of this water from the
valley fill who do not have basic surface rights. If it is assumed
that this water is a part of the base flow of the river and if we
further assume that all of the surface water in the Rio Grande
has been appropriated, then it would appear that these junior
appropriators who do not have surface water rights are subject
to injunction suits. This again illustrates the fact that the law
makers and the courts have not realized the inter-relationshin
between surface and ground water. The law has considered each
of these types of water as being separate comnartments whereas
the hydrologists know that each is only part of the hydrologic cycle.
The critical condition of our water supplies in the West may well
cause the time lag between science and law to be fatal.
A recent court case in Chaves County raised the nuestion of
the relationship between surface and ground water. In the case
of State v. Lillard Owen,19 the State sought to enjoin the use of
Thomas, The Conservation of Ground Water. p. 153.
,s Conover, C. S., Ground-water Conditions in the Rincon and Mesifla Vaflies
and Adiacent Areas in New Mexico. U. S. Geol. Survey, Typed Sept., October 1950.
" Chaves County Cause No. 17109.
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ground water without permit from the State Engineer. The defendant claimed that he had a surface right from the Hondo River
and that junior appropriators of artesian water had caused his
surface supply to be diminished or dried up entirely. He further
contended that it was necessary for him to drill a well to protect
his rights. The District Court granted a temporary injunction on
the grounds that even though the defendant might change his
point of diversion from a surface to an underground source, he
would still have to have a permit from the State Engineer to affect
the change and, at the time of the hearing, the defendant did not
have such a permit. It is the State's position that the facts of that
particular case will not bear out the defendant's contention that
the artesian appropriators have impaired his surface rights. However, there are some streams whose flows have been affected by
ground water diversions. If prior appropriators along such streams
can prove that their rights have been impaired by junior artesian
diversions, then this could be the basis for some interesting water
law controversies and certainly would be the making of new
water law.
The biggest problem in the administration of ground water
law in New Mexico, at the present time, is that of applying the
doctrine of prior appropriation to ground water basins under storage conditions. For example, in the Lea County Basin, the hydrologists tell us that if the underground reservoir there were emptied,
it would take some 30 centuries to refill at present estimated rates
of natural recharge.2 0 The best estimate of the amount of annual
recharge to that basin is in the neighborhood of 1/ " per year. The
hydrologists also point out that under natural conditions the
amount of recharge and discharge were the same. The program
of irrigation in the High Plains area of New Mexico and Texas
has had negligible effect on the amount of discharge so that for
all practicable purposes the recharge and discharge in that area
have remained constant. Such areas are called storage reservoirs
and some hydrologists have pointed out that the appropriation of
water from such basins amounts to the same thing as mining water.
New Mexico law provides that the State Engineer shall, if he
finds that there is unappropriated water or that further appropriation will not impair existing rights, grant new permits. 21 The
question that I ask you to consider is how do we determine there
is unappropriated water under such conditions? Our ground water
laws have been based upon surface water concepts. On a surface
stream it would be easy to say that all the water is appropriated
when there is no water left to flow down the stream or, in other
words, we might say that a stream is fully appropriated when the
appropriation equals the amount of annual recharge, but in a
storage basin like Lea County, we could not utilize any of the
"Theis, C. V., ProgressReport on the Ground Water S-upply of Lea County,
New Mexico, New Mexico St. Engineer 11th Bien. Rept. (1935), p. 151.
" Laws of 1931, Ch. 131; Stats. 1941 Ann. § 77-1103 as amended 1943.
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water if we say that the basin is fully appropriated when the appropriation equals the amount of recharge.
In two recent cases in Lea County, now pending before the
District Court of Lea County, Cooper v. John H. Bliss, State Engineer," and Lawrence v. John H. Bliss, State Engineer,23 this problem was squarely before the District Court. In both cases the plaintiffs filed applications with the State Engineer to appropriate
ground water of the Lea County Underground Basin. The State
Engineer denied their applications on the grounds that there was
no unappropriated water and that additional appropriations would
impair existing rights. At the time of the trials the State Engineer testified to the effect that he considered that a basin such as
Lea County was fully appropriated when there was enough water
remaining in storage to allow the prior appropriators a reasonable
amount of water for a reasonable length of time. He explained
to the Court that there is no way that the water of a storage basin
can be utilized so that the appropriators will have a right to the
use of that water in perpetuity.
This problem is indeed a perplexing one. As a lawyer, I can't
say that I know the answer. It is one wherein the law makers
and the courts need the fullest cooperation from those who are
specialists in the science of ground water. Many of us who have
studied the problem feel that an irrigation economy should last
for at least 40 years. Forty years is usually considered as the
longest time for all farm loans. REA loans are amortized over
this period and this period of time has been commonly used for
payment under reclamation projects. It would appear that a lesser
period of time would not enable a farmer to make a substantial
investment and get a fair return on same. Also, the community
and the State should be considered with their investment in roads.
banks, schools, trading centers, gins, etc. I am wondering, and I
throw out for consideration, whether or not these economic factors
should be considered when the hydrologists talk about optimum
development. In any calculations involving the question of what
should be done with our tremendous ground water resources, we
should consider the aquifer characteristics so that we can utilize
the maximum amount of water over the maximum period of time.
In the High Plains area there is no problem of salt encroachment
and it appears to be a case where we can take the water out within
a relatively short time or extend the life of the basin over a greater
period of years. The hydrologists point out that under an ideal
program we would have spacings of wells and spacings of irrigated
lands. Under actual conditions this is hard to achieve because
of the variation in soil conditions and the variations in the landowner's desire to go in for irrigation projects.
An additional question raised by the Lea County cases in"Lea County Cause No. 9565.
" Lea County Cause No. 9979.
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volves the scope of review of the decisions of the State Engineer.
Section 77-601, related to appeal from the decision of the State
Enginer, states: " * * * The proceeding upon appeal shall be de
novo except evidence taken in hearing before the State Engineer
may be considered as original evidence subject to legal objection,
the same as if said evidence was originally offered in such District Court * * * ". As far as this writer can determine, there has
been no case in this jurisdiction or in any other jurisdiction involving the judicial scope of the review of a decision of any state
engineer. Can Section 77-601 be reconciled with Section 1 Article
3 of the Constitution of New Mexico which provides, "the powers
of the government of this state are divided into three distinct
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial, and no person
or collection of persons charged with the exercises of the powers
properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any
powers properly belonging to either of the others, except as in
this Constitution or otherwise expressly directed or permitted."
Although the New Mexico Supreme Court has not ruled upon
the scope of review of the decisions of the State Engineer, it has
ruled many times on this question with regard to other administrative agencies. From a review of the cases on this point it would
appear that the New Mexico Court is committed to the doctrine
that the courts may not overrule the acts of administrative officers
on matters committed to their discretion unless their actions are
unlawful, unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or not supported by
24
evidence.

EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUN ITI ES
The Federal Bureau of Investigation is again employing Special Agents, who are law graduates, at a starting salary of $5,500
per annum. These are investigative positions with career opportunities and excellent retirement benefits at age fifty. Applicants
must be American citizens between the ages of twenty-five and
forty inclusive, with no physical defects and available for assignment anywhere in the United States or its territorial possessions.
Additional information may be obtained from the Denver office
of the FBI, Room 254, New Custom House, telephone AComa 5981.
A vacancy has been created by the resignation of Terry J.
O'Neill, secretary of the Denver and Colorado Bar Associations
and Editor of Dicta. Lawyers with energy and administrative
ability are invited to apply at the bar associatiop office if interested
in filling this position.
"Seward v. D.&R.G., 17 N. M. 557; Seaberg v. Raton Public Service Company, 36 N. M. 59; Harris v. State Corporation Commission, 46 N. M. 352;
Transportation Company, Inc. vs. State Corporation Commission, 51 N. M. 59;
Yarbrough v. Montoya, 214 Pac. 2d 769.
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WE PAY WITH DEATH*
PALMER HOYT
A Speech Delivered by Mr. Hoyt, Editor and Publisher, The Denver Post,
at the 75th Annual Convention of the American Bar Association
at Boston, Massachusetts, August 25, 1958

Mr. Chairman, members of the American Bar Association,
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I am here today to speak to you on the general subject of
public interest in traffic laws, traffic courts and the need for cooperation between the press, the bar and the public in facing the
problem that traffic connotes.
May I say at the start that I am greatly impressed with what
the American Bar Association is doing relative to our traffic courts
and our traffic problems. But as I researched the whole question,
I was even more impressed with the great need for further effort,
not only by the bar association, but by the press as well, and of
course the public.
As I read your scholarly theses on traffic, I began to realize
that the traffic court is much more important than laymen realize,
even laymen in the newspaper business had believed. It is important because for a tremendous segment of our population, the
only contact they will ever have with the processes of the law is
through a traffic court.
The whole problem is highlighted by the increase in cars and
drivers. The grisly totals of dead and maimed mount and assume
new importance as our country grows, our population increases,
our highways extend and our manufacturers make more and more
automobiles.
The toll in blood and property paid by human kind in this
age of 70 million drivers fascinates me. Thirty-eight thousand
dead in 1952, 1,350,000 injured, property damage at $3.5 billion!
Seventy million men and women behind the wheels of 55 million
automobiles. In 1951 out of 1695 cities representing a population
of 54,424,000 people, there were 15,396,081 motor vehicle violations. And of that number, five million were known as "moving
violations." It has been estimated that the total of traffic court
defendants in a single year now exceeds 20,000,000 by far.
Where will it all end?
Children aren't yet being born with wheels attached ready to
roll on our highways but it is almost as though the forces of evolution were at work in attaching such mechanical devices to our
children, because at the age of sixteen in most states they become
involved in a set of wheels and thereafter are virtually helpless
without them.
With the mounting rate of automobile accidents, fatal and
otherwise, which are forming a grave threat to our economy and
to our civilization, I have been wondering at what point the laws
of evolution and the laws of survival will cross.
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To illustrate, when I was a little boy in Vermont, we had a
horse named Billie. Billie was of Morgan stock and was reputed
to have done a mile on the ice in three minutes. In any event,
he was a rugged animal and a rugged individualist. Of all things
living or dead, he hated most the automobile. There were a few
of them around in 1907-08 in the quiet little village of Derby, Vermont. Every time Billie saw an automobile, he ran away. He
wrecked several buggies. Only the family's love for this precocious
horse prevented my father from selling him or trading him off.
Yes, Billie ran off many times, and as I say, the sight of an
automobile drove him to absolute frenzy.
As the years rolled by I have had occasion to witness other
horses and their attitude toward automobiles. For example, I was
going up to the Routt National Forest not so long ago, our sedan
closely following a pickup truck that was traveling down the
country road. The road itself meandered from one side of its 60foot right of way to the other, and at several points passed close
to the fence. Suddenly, we came up and passed three horses dozing
in the morning sun, their heads nodding over the barbed wire.
From the car window, I could have flicked them on the noses, so
close were they. Yet not a one of these horses cocked an ear or
opened an eye.
Apparently in the evolutionary processes, the horses who
were frightened of automobiles had eliminated themselves.
In this regard, I have been asking different people what became of the kind of chickens that used to cross the country roads
only to be killed in the process. Today, you can find many a
chicken peacefully eating on his own side of the road and making
no effort to seek the other side at the risk of his neck.
Will it be so with the human race? Will the people who cause
accidents, who drive recklessly, will they and their kind be eliminated as the Frankenstein of the automobile traffic reaches new
and terrifying proportions in this the Atomic age?
In this advancing era of dangerous mechanisms, will the
smashed fender become as common as a scuffed shoe? And will
the carburetor replace the human heart? I don't know, but I do
know that if anybody is kidding about two cars in the garage,
he has got another. think coming. This is becoming the machine
age in fact, and anyone who can hold a social security card is at
least a potential applicant for a driver's license.
When I accepted the assignment of addressing this section
of the American Bar Association on the general subject of "Public Interest in Traffic Laws and Traffic Courts," I thought perhaps
I could tell you something about the laws and courts that you
didn't know. Or to put it another way: I thought I could emphasize the need for reform and improvement, in terms of the
crushing problem under which the public generally is laboring.
I find that the A.B.A. has had special committees working on
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"high standards" for traffic courts, cooperating with the national
safety council, state and local bar associations and the conference
of chief justices of state supreme courts.
The best material on this subject that ever crossed my desk
is the work of James P. Economos of Chicago, Director of the
traffic court program of the American Bar Association since 1943.
Let me throw out a handful of topics generally related to traffic laws and courts, and then pick several of them up for hurried
and personalized application: procedures for arrest in traffic law
violations; the conduct of traffic court; the quality and qualifications of judges and justices of the peace; the principles of progressive fines and sentences; the uniformity of codes and arrest
processes; the licensing and inspection of drivers and vehicles;
the engineering and economics of urban, intrastate anJ interstate
streets and highways. There are others, but the foregoing will do
for now.
There is not one of the subsections in the general traffic problem which we individually cannot do something about if we will.
How many of us, for example, are contributing to the delinquency
of our constitutional system by condoning kangaroo courts of first
impression-courts which you know are regularly violating the
simple and fundamental rights of citizens-your clients and others?
There are police courts, municipal courts, traffic courts and
justice of peace courts which today are
1. Exceeding their statutory jurisdiction in imposing fines
and sentences.
2. Willfully and arbitrarily ignoring the doctrine of contributory negligence.
3. Suspending abnormally heavy fines as a condition of restitution in personal property damage cases.
4. Holding defendants improperly and too long in custody
pending the collection of information on damages and insurance.
5. Abusing or ignoring basic rights of defendants-the right
to counsel, to trial by jury, to enter a plea. There are courts in
which racial identity, competence of individual expression or economic status of defendants befoul justice-just as surely as pecuniary bribery.
Are members of the American Bar Association, as professional men and citizens, as zealous and persistent in their demand
for a high order of justice of the land? Let me tell you a stirring
story-a true life story-of effective citizenship by the lawyers
of a small western community.
The newspaper of a city in central Washington editorially
recommended the defeat of a police judge who was, in its opinion, performing in a manner inimical to justice in that town. The
paper wrote a comprehensive and severe criticism of the judge,
and ventured the opinion that all responsible members of the
bench and bar agreed with its view. The judge was defeated at
the polls. He then sued the paper for $50,000 libel.
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Although the newspaper insisted it had gone no further than
fair comment and criticism, and pleaded privilege under the laws
of that state, it was forced to trial, and to prove the truth of its
allegations. Twenty-two lawyers of that little town came to the
paper's defense--concurring in its appraisal of the plaintiff as
an officer of the court, and exposing themselves to the humiliating
attack of the plaintiff's counsel. Not one lawyer supported that
judge; although being a pioneer of the community and a veteran
in the profession-he was not without personal friends among
the bar. The newspaper won its case after two trials. And the
police court in that city is now presided over by a younger member of the bar who is making a proud record in the improvement
of procedures.
In one of his interesting papers Mr. Economos has pointed
out that of 12,900,000 traffic cases filed in 729 cities of 10,000
population and more, 9,700,000 were "processed" by traffic violations bureaus; only 3,213,000 went to court. And, he says, courts
are able to exercise a deterring influence upon only about one-third
of the maximum number of persons that should be charged with
traffic violations. It is his opinion, and I think it makes sense,
that "any moving violation may be considered hazardous and
should be subject to court action."
It doesn't work out that way, as you know. But considering
the competence and integrity of some of our lesser courts-answer
for yourself whether justice thus by-passed i4 worse or better
than justice in blindfold.
It has been truly said that the traffic court, the police court,
the justice of peace court are at the heart of the traffic problem
in this country. For it is in these lower courts that one finds a
great opportunity for educating the American driver. It is essential that these courts be properly operated if we are to have good
citizenship.
Good citizenship is not a passive thing; it demands action.
And in furthering traffic safety, it requires more than a resolution
in the bar association, a service club contribution for school boy
patrol uniforms or a single vote for improvement bonds at election time. It demands letters to the editor, attendance at council
meetings, visits with public officials, and political action committees that respect both politics and action.
It has been said that if manufacturers could engineer maximum safety into vehicles, it might cut the accident rate 5 to 10
per cent; if we would spend the billions necessary to engineer
safer highways, we could lop another 5 to 10 per cent off the
horrible rate of craches. But 80 to 90 per cent of the accidents
can be eliminated only by education and adequate enforcement.
Now adequate enforcement demands money. Money requires
taxes. Everybody is complaining about taxes, and for good reason. But the people can't have their canapes and eat them, too.
And it is a poor place to start economizing-at precisely the point
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where one exposes himself and his family to the murderous threat
of 55 million improperly regulated automobiles and trucks.
To a great extent the problem of traffic laws and traffic courts
has been talked thin. When we are confronted by the inertia of
legislatures in the matters of enforcement appropriations, improved highways, more uniform licensing and inspection, the recodification of laws and judicial reform-well, we quit or retreat.
You know how excited you can become as a member of a local
committee advocating court reform, and how quickly you become
discouraged when checkmated in the confusion of the legislature
by the smoothly oiled lobby in opposition. So we return to talking about the matter; and the toll of dead and maimed mounts
by the year.
My plea is for organized, thoughtful and sustained action by
members of the American Bar. Enough is to be done, in horizontal
projects proceeding from the general dilemma called traffic, to
justify the concentrated action of good citizens and dedicated
lawyers for years ahead. It would seem past due that state bar
associations take the leadership in reorganizing the justice of
peace system-today's anachronism No. 1 in American Jurisprudence. Let the lawyers in the small towns of America direct
prompt and professional scrutiny toward the quality of justice in
our lesser courts.
We cannot afford to have millions of Americans run through
shabby, undignified, incompetent courts on traffic violations. This
country cannot expose millions of her citizens to tobacco juice
justice or to pettifogging ignorance of dime store tyrants who
operate from the authority of the American bench and still preserve any respect for law, order and due process.
The lawyers of America know that better than anyone else.
May they, then, dedicate themselves anew to constructive action
in behalf of better justice; let them look beyond the vistas of their
own practice-and back, perhaps, to the justice, police and traffic
courts. Let them realize that often, in an atmosphere of stale
whiskey, flophouse palor and the wretchedness of improvidence
and despair-American justice undergoes its most severe trial;
that not in the pristine coolness and hush of the United States
Supreme Court but in the crude and smelly interior of a courthouse basement are constitutional rights at greater and more
frequent issue.
The reward for such public service by the lawyers of this
country can be predicated in terms not only of better justice; but
in the saving of human life, the conservation of dearly bought
and coveted treasure and a greater measure of safety for modern
human beings who are being driven ever closer to the prospect
of violent death in a violent age.
There can be no question as to the readiness of newspapers
and other media to serve as the good right arm of any movement
by or for our traffic courts to improve safety and law obdience.
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If traffic courts are not attended regularly and constantly
by assigned reporters, it is because the courts have become little
more than processing chambers. A quick look at the record after
a day's business contains about as much information as a reporter
needs to tell what happened, for all the juridical wisdom and
pondered decisions that have marked that day's proceedings.
But it could be vastly different.
The traffic courts could make it different.
Not infrequently, in handing down a decision, a perspicuous
judge in one of our higher courts will make a pronouncement
which far transcends in importance the immediate case and the
decision itself.
Let such a judge declare a wayward child's plight to be the
fault of irresponsible parents, and he cites a lesson which will
be read by untold sympatheic persons. Let such a judge call the
truth on an evil of society which led a man or woman to downfall,
and the same is true.
Yet I can remember no case in which the judge of a traffic
court has offered such nourishment to the thought of his community and the country although his opportunities to do so are
almost boundless.
Is there a confusing or dangerous intersection in your town
or city? There are several in mine, where accidents occur with
regularity and where traffic tickets are given frequently.
Suppose the judge of the traffic court accompanied his fines
or punishment for violations occurring at such an intersection
with a withering criticism of the cause of confusion or danger?
Surely those responsible for the condition are parties to the incident that leads to court, and the judge should say so publicly
every time he has a chance.
Would that be news? I can tell you one newspaper where it
would land on page 1, and it would probably stay on page 1 until
something was done about it.
It would be impossible, physically as well as financially, to
devote the time and cost of complete court trials to all of the hundreds of thousands of traffic cases. Yet I fear that administrators
of the law have become so impressed by the great numbers of
cases that they are consciously or unconsciously committed to
treat their dockets as an assembly line rather than a series of
individual cases in each of which one or more citizens are involved.
In the course of a year, a district court may handle several
dozen cases of major importance. Each may involve one or several persons whose futures may be at stake in the decision, and
each may decide the disposition of thousands of dollars in money.
Yet, when the weight of these cases in human experience and
possessions is weighed against the same human interests involved
in the thousands of traffic cases within the same community, the
so-called lower courts loom in their true proportions.
One of the compelling challenges for the traffic courts lies in
the fact that no other force in our society has yet come forth with
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a successful program for making the highways and streets safe.
Goodness knows that newspapers, radio, television, magazines,
safety councils, automobile associations, and others have tried
hard to find the effective means of stopping the death, mayhem and
financial calamity that goes on about us every minute of the day
and night.
Of course, we don't know how much more devastating the
carnage and destruction might be if all these forces had not been
active for years. Surely they have done a great deal of good.
But so have the highway engineers, and so have the law enforcement bodies, and so have the automobile manufacturers, the
makers of tires, and all the rest of the people who have a humanitarian or direct business interest in making driving safer.
The fact remains that nothing we have done has been good
enough to be successful.
There has grown up in our national consciousness an attitude
of something akin to futility-worse, even acceptance-in facing
the facts of the present highway toll.
We have all seen this evidenced. Let twenty or so persons,
from infancy to adulthood, be stricken with an epidemic like polio,
and die within the space of a month, and a whole city will be
aroused. There will be general alarm, and health authorities will
begin working frantically to stop the disease.
But let these same people die in automobile accidents in the
same period, and we treat it almost as routine-a few headlines,
true; but the impact is neither as great nor as long lasting.
There's something about that stream of cars and trucks forever buzzing past us that seems to mesmerize us all, whether we
are one of those at the wheel, or just watching the flow. I can
cite a personal experience.
Only a couple of weeks ago, I was crossing an intersection in
my car when a truck ahead of me suddenly turned right, a long
iron pipe extending aft from it a number of feet. The truck, in
addition to the unsignalled turn, then stopped suddenly. The pipe
crashed through the right side of my windshield, shattering it.
It didn't go clear through, thanks to my own brakes and to shatterproof glass.
Now I won't say that death just grazed me; yet actually it
could have been much closer than I am wont to believe.
It was just as close, for instance, as it would have been had
a hundred-pound chunk of masonry been dropped from a five-story
building as I passed on the sidewalk below, missing me by a scant
three feet.
I drove on, told a few of my associates about the pipe and the
windshield, and heard them make a few remarks about my being
fortunate it wasn't worse.
But if I had faced peril in the form of falling masonry, though
missing death as far as I did in the actual case, I know my associates would have talked about it for days. I would have considered
it a miracle, and there probably would have been a city investigation as to why citizens' lives were endangered by falling stone.
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I suppose the point is that people are just missing death and
injury all the time in cars, but materials drop from buildings onto
sidewalks only once in a very long while.
Or let's take a very dramatic example-that of the Korean
war.
The war lasted from June 25, 1950, to July 27, 1953. By the
best estimates now available, 25,604 American men lost their lives
in that conflict to test whether Communism was to continue to
ambush the free world unopposed.
In that same period of three years, one month and two days,
115,750 American men, women and children lost their lives in
traffic accidents-trying to prove nothing, contributing nothing
to their country's security. Because the slaughter goes on and
on, they haven't even the immortal satisfaction given to many
men-particularly soldiers-that their deaths gave us something
to live by.
Those who died beside our highways and on our city streets,
however, are just as dead and each one leaves just as big a gap
in a family or community or in society at large, as those killed on
battlefields.
But the minute one thinks of this contrast, he is confronted
with this revealing realization: deaths in war are dramaticthey strike the imagination, the national heart. Deaths in autobiles are not, and all the efforts that have been made to bring the
people to grasp the enormity of the thing have had pitifully little avail.
And, of course, one unassailable objective of a conference such
as this is to do everything possible toward the acceptance of uniform traffic laws for the whole country.
It is not only absurd, but it is unthinkable that a signal recommended in most states for a left turn can mean a right turn
in one or more other states. To make it the law to stay inside a line
in one state, and require the driver to straddle it in another is dangerous almost to the point of being criminally so.
One valuable feature of a driver's licensing system is that it
enables the state to exercise some control over drunken and reckless motorists. Provision is made in the traffic code now for suspension or revocation. Any motorist caught driving after his
license has been taken away from him automatically should be
subject to imprisonment. Jail sentence in such cases should be
mandatory.
Since the coming of the automobile more American lives have
been sacrificed in, motor accidents than in all the wars in which
our nation has engaged. In December of 1951 the millionth motor
death occurred. Wars, fortunately, are intermittent. But death
on, the highway is continuous. This deplorable truth demonstrates
that effective control of traffic has not been attained despite our
expensive attempts to enforce the jungle of laws written to establish mastery over the individualistic American motorist.
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Despite the serious efforts over the years to promote uniform
traffic legislation we must admit that there is much to be desired
in stating the rules which govern use of the road by motor vehicles. Traffic legislation throughout the nation should not only be
uniform, but as simple and sensible as possible.
The nearly 70 million motorists driving the 55 million vehicles in the 48 states and District of Columbia will not bother to
learn or comply with conflicting and complicated laws in different
states and cities. Nor can they reasonably be expected to do so.
This has long been recognized by many organizations and
governmental bodies. Since 1926 a uniform vehicle code has been
in existence. It consists of five separate acts: the uniform motor
vehicle administration, registration, certificate of title and antitheft act, enacted in considerable Part in 17 jurisdictions; the
uniform motor vehicle operators' and chauffeurs' act, substantially
adopted in 28 states, although every state except South Dakota
has a drivers' license law; the uniform motor vehicle safety responsibility act, enacted in principle in 40 jurisdictions; and the
uniform act regulating traffic on highways, containing the rules
of the road and therefore the most important statute of all in
providing safety, approved substantially in only 28 states. This
is a disconcerting and discouraging record. It is to the shame of
the states that Michigan alone has codified its motor vehicle laws
with the uniform vehicle code as a model.
Think what it would mean to the cause of traffic law enforcement in every state to be able to eliminate the irrelevant but perfectly human plea: "I'm sorry, but I didn't know the law. It's
different in my state." Think of the stimulating effect to traffic
education if we could assure everyone that the traffic laws, except
for minor variations brought on by local conditions, were the
same everywhere. Surely the public has the right to expect rules
of the road and hand signals that are uniform in every state and
speed limits that are rational in the light of Present day conditions. Only when we have achieved uniformity in our basic traffic
legislation may we hope for uniformity in interpretation, in administration, and in enforcement on which both respect for law and
effective enforcement depend. It is as simple as that.
When we turn from state statutes to look at municipal ordinances, we enter a jungle 6f local law. These ordinances date
from various periods, reflect varying concepts of traffic law enforcement, and. like most ordinances, are quite unknown to all
save expert. The model traffic ordinance, first prepared in 1928
and since revised several times, is available as a guide to the
diligent. (Colorado, fortunately, has taken a definite step forward
in respect to this ordinance.) By statute any municipality may
adopt the model traffic ordinance simply by referring to the statute in any ordinance, and many municipalities have done so.
By and large, it is still a jungle of law, a no-man's land of
complexities.
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As long as we have ordinances such as we do, nobody can
possibly assert that he knows all the law. If practicing lawyers
do not know the ordinances of their home towns, how can we
expect the motorist, who glides through a score of-or a hundred
-municipalities in a single trip, to know them?
And now finally, may I point out that we must improve traffic
courts. You as lawyers and members of the A.B.A. are committed
to that course. We must improve automobiles so that to make
them more nearly safety perfect. And, of course, we must improve highways and build into them all modern .safety devices.
But as you know and as I know, we could do all this and still we
will have only solved a small part of the problem we face. We
must increase the individual responsibility of the citizen and the
motorist through education in our schools, our colleges and our
newspapers, radios and television. Even education doesn't do the
job unless it leads to the development of individual responsibility.
This is the kind of thing to which we must dedicate ourselves and
our associations.

COLORADO BAR FOUNDATION
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LAWYERS WORK TOWARDS TRAFFIC COURT
IMPROVEMENT IN COLORADO
ROBERT B. KEATING*
of the Denver Bar

The United States since the adoption by the American Bar
Association in 1942 of the 57 recommendations for improving traffic courts, based on the Warren Report,' has been witnessing a
great "reform" movement relative to the administration of justice
through the traffic court system. Throughout the country the public
and the lawyers have been demanding improvements in court procedure and general operation of the courts. The increase in the
use of the automobile and the number of people behind the wheels
of the vehicles has necessarily given rise to increased activity in
the traffic court field. The American Bar Association, state and
local bar associations have been devoting considerable time in
working with the National Safety Council, the Automotive Safety
Foundation and local safety organizations interested in highway
safety-and traffic court administration. The lawyers through their
associations have helped to pinpoint the deficiencies existing in.
our traffic court system.
Colorado has been recognized as one of the forerunners in
traffic court improvement and highway safety. The traffic court
committee of the Colorado Bar Association can take pride in its
work during the past few years.
In 1944 Colorado held one of the earlier state-wide traffic
conferences, followed by sectional meetings in each judicial district in the state except Denver. The Colorado Bar Association
was one of several sponsors of these conferences. In 1951 Governor Dan Thornton, with the assured assistance and cooperation of the American Bar Association, Colorado Bar Association
and the University of Colorado School of Law and other organizations interested in improving highway traffic safety and traffic courts, called for a state highway safety conference to be
held in our state and to be known as the Governor's Highway
Safety Conference. A conference of this sort was held in 1951
and as a result of this conference twenty-five recommendations
relative to traffic court improvement were made. In submitting these recommendations it was felt that the inauguration
of any one or series of them would help to modernize the administration of justice through our traffic courts. It was recognized that in Colorado we have various types of traffic courts,
namely the justice of peace, police magistrates', and municipal
traffic courts and that many of the suggestions were not amenable
George Warren on "Traffic Courts" published by National Conference of
Judicial Councils in 1942.
* Chairman of Colorado Bar Association Traffic Courts Committee.
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to use under each system. The recommendations of the 1951 conference were as follows:
1. That corrective punishment should be designed to deter
individual violators and impress the need for voluntary observance.
2. That flexible standards within minimum and maximum
limits as opposed to set penalties are recommended.
3. That juvenile violators should be tried by traffic courts
except where a behavior problem is involved. (The issuance of
a driver's license to a juvenile carries with it the same responsibilities as the issuance of a driver's license to any other person.)
4. Driver licenses should be suspended or revoked on recommendation of the court as an additional penalty.
5. That trial judges be permitted to require the surrender of
driver licenses not only in cases where a mandatory revocation
is required but also in all other cases where in the opinion of
the trial judge it shall serve the public interest to deprive said
person of his driving privileges and to submit said driver's license
to the Department of Revenue, and the Department of Revenue
hold a hearing as in all other cases of driver license suspension
and revocation and said suspension shall commence upon final
conviction.
6. That the courts should use accident records and statistical
data for the education of violators; and where feasible use traffic
schools. Corrective penalties by the court should be made to fit
the individual as well as be adequate for the violation.
7. That traffic cases should be tried separately from other
court business.
8. That physical courtroom conditions should be improved in
order to obtain dignity and impressiveness in the surroundings.
9. That court costs should be included as a part of the total
judgment assessed against the violator and that written receipts
should be delivered upon payment.
10. That a law school in the state in cooperation with the
American Bar Association and the Traffic Institute of Northwestern University conduct a traffic court conference for judges and
prosecutors in the immediate future.
11. That all Sustices of the Peace be required to attend a
conference at the call of the governor at least once in each year
and that the expenses for participation therein be defrayed by the
individual counties.
12. That traffic court violation bureaus be organized wherever necessary for the purpose of handling parking and standing
violations only.
13. That the Penalty Assessment System operated in the State
of Colorado is unique in the United States and that it should be
continued; steps, however, should be taken to provide increased
penalties
for repeaters.
14. That
all violators of traffic laws be required to appear in
open court at a stated time and place to answer the violation upon
written, formal charges.

Feb., 1954

DICTA

15. That failure to appear to an original summons or citation
by the court or official shall be a separate violation requiring the
assessment of additional penalty.
16. That in addition thereto that if said failure to appear in
answer to an original summons or citation by the court or official
shall be for more than 30 days that then it shall call for immediate suspension of the driving privileges by the State Motor Vehicle Division and that said suspension shall remain in full force
and effect until the violator has appeared in response to the original summons or citation and that all traffic citations be required
to contain information of this additional penalty.
17. That standards of dignity in the conduct of traffic courts
should be raised.
18. That each traffic charge should be tried separately.
19. That prior to receiving and entering the plea of violators
that the judge or other court official should read the complaint to
the violator and the judge should state instruction as to the nature
of the plea of guilty and plea of not guilty and the penalties that
may be assessed under the violation charged and also that the
defendant be instructed as to all his legal rights.
20. That court room procedure should be uniform throughout the state and that the attorney general be asked to prepare
and publish a manual for that purpose; that said manual be delivered at state expense to each traffic court judge now in office and
to all newly elected and appointed judges hereinafter appointed
and elected and duly qualified.
21. That there is need for legislation prohibiting fixing or
attempts to fix traffic charges or secure reduction therein and that
adequate penalties be provided for the violation thereof.
22. That the defendant's previous traffic record be brought
by the prosecuting official to the attention of the traffic judge
after the determination of guilt and before judgment or sentence.
23. That all courts report all moving traffic violation convictions to the State Motor Vehicle Division.
24. That the appointment, nomination and election of traffic
court judges should be based on merit and fitness. That all political parties be earnestly requested to use more care, where required, in nominating qualified persons for judicial positions.
That adequate salary be provided for all judicial officers so that
qualified persons may be willing to serve.
25. That qualified judges are needed to handle traffic cases,
and all traffic courts, rural and urban, should be supervised on a
state-wide basis by the chief justice of the highest appellate court
of the state.
One further recommendation was that a state-wide traffic
court conference be held dealing solely with traffic courts. The
1951 conference was not limited to traffic courts but included matters dealing with enforcement, education, engineering and motor
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vehicle administration, as well as ordinances and court administration.
In March of 1952 a Governor's Traffic Court Conference was
held in Denver, Colorado, and was the largest meeting of the kind
ever to be conducted in any state with the exception of the state
of New Jersey. Working with the Colorado Highway Safety Council and the University of Colorado School of Law were the American Bar Association, Colorado Bar Association, Northwestern University Traffic Institute, the State Association of County Commissioners, the Colorado Municipal League, the State Association
of Sheriffs and Peace Officers, and the State Association of Justices of the Peace, Police Magistrates and Constables and the seven
state departments represented on the State Highway Safety
Council.
The activities of the state traffic court conference included a
demonstration of a model procedure for traffic courts. From a
prepared script, representatives of the participating associations
dramatized the correct procedure, following as nearly as possible
the twenty-five recommendations submitted by the 1951 conference. It was during this conference that the Colorado State Model
Traffic Ordinance was discussed with those in attendance, resulting to date in the adoption of the model ordinance by 56 cities in
Colorado. The conference discussed the question of the proper
penalty to be assessed in various violations taking into consideration the views of judges, enforcement officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys and members of the lay public.
It was recognized that all judges, law enforcement officers,
attorneys and members of the citizenry interested in traffic court
improvement could not travel to Denver to attend the conference,
so it was recommended that sectional conferences be planned, organized and conducted by representatives of the participating organizations and agencies in various parts of our state.
The sectional traffic court conferences were held in Sterling,
Colorado, on July 8, 1952, and on eleven subsequent days in other
cities of the state geographically situated so that anyone could
participate in a traffic court conference without having to travel
any great distance. Each sectional conference followed a well defined program. Panel discussions were held on current traffic
court problems in the particular area and on what was being done
to correct similar problems throughout the state, cooperation between the motor vehicle department and local authorities, and
the success of the use of the Model Traffic Ordinance. In all of
these discussions the experiences and opinions of members of
the bar were considered and used in formulating plans for .changes
and improvements.
As a result of many judges attending the conferences the
Colorado Association of Justices of the Peace, Magistrates and
Constables called a conference of its own to analyze the problems
facing them, taking into consideration all of the problems, deficiencies and recommendations brought out in the section conferences
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and the governor's conference. The practicability and feasibility
of carrying out the recommendations of all the conferences was
discussed in light of the various forms of traffic courts used in
Colorado. Each judge was able after the meeting to return to his
own county, precinct or city and see if many of the glaring problems could be remedied, with the thought of reporting at the next
meeting after a certain "trial" period.
It was determined that a Governor's Highway Safety Conference would be held every two years, thus giving ample opportunity to try out the recommended changes and giving sufficient
time to re-examine the problems in the particular locale. It was
also felt that in between the conferences the various associations
should begin to formulate definite plans and study groups in
preparation for the next conference.
The Governor's Highway Safety Conference for 1953 was
held in June in Denver and approximately 800 people registered
including lawyers from various parts of the state. Many recommendations were made by the various sections and those dealing
directly with traffic courts were as follows:
1. It is recommended that the Model Traffic Ordinance for
Colorado Municipalities be adopted by the city council or board
of each town, city or mpnicipality in the state of Colorado.
2. It is recommended that the Colorado Bar Association and
the Colorado Associations of Justices of the Peace, Magistrates
and Constables cooperate in the preparation of a guide leading to
a more uniform system in traffic fines and penalties.
3. It is recommended that the Colorado State Legislature
revise and amend the state statutes relating to the justice of the
peace court costs.
4. It is recommended that the state statute relating to mandatory revocations of drivers' licenses be amended to permit the
director of revenue to exercise his discretion in cases of first final
conviction of driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquors.
5. It is recommended that the tenure of office of the county
sheriffs, justices of the peace and constables be changed to four
years. It is also recommended that the salaries and working conditions of county sheriffs, justices of the peace, city police officers
and constables be adjusted so as to be commensurate with those
of business and industry to the end that qualified personnel may
be induced to remain in law enforcement service.
6. That consideration be given to delegating to the judiciary
the power of revocation and suspension of operators' and chauffeurs' licenses of persons convicted of violations of motor vehicle
laws and ordinances.
The 1953 Governor's Traffic Court Conference was held in
Denver on November 18 and 19. This conference was sponsored
by those who sponsored the original conference in March of 1952.
The conference was well attended by enforcement officers, judges,
district attorneys and county attorneys. Very few lawyers, though,
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participated in the conference, except those representing some law
enforcement agency. One of the most interesting panel discussions was the one dealing with the topic "Interrelations between
Traffic Courts and Enforcement Officers." Representatives of the
Denver Police Department, Colorado Bar Association, Colorado
State Patrol, justices of the peace and municipal traffic judges
discussed the proper place of the law enforcement officers and their
relation to the traffic judges.
There were other panel discussions dealing with the question
of whether all moving violations should be tried before a judge,
or whether the traffic violations method of assessing a penalty
should continue to be utilized, also another panel on the "Proper
Penalty to be Assessed in Traffic Court Cases." James P. Economos
of the American Bar Association once again directed a demonstration of the model traffic procedure to be used in a traffic court.
Two national figures in traffic safety and traffic court improvement addressed the conference on traffic law enforcement and the
court's role in the education of the traffic violators. Mr. Franklin
M. Kreml, Director of the Traffic Institute of Northwestern University, praised the State of Colorado for its excellent traffic law
enforcement and the decrease in the number of accidents and
fatalities. Mr. Economos discussed how the traffic judge can
serve as an instructor for the people coming before him to answer
to charges of violating the traffic laws of the city or the state.
Once again this conference passed on several recommendations
as a result of the discussions and addresses presented during the
two day conference. Among the more important resolutions passed
were the following:
1. That a series of regional conferences patterned after the
Governor's Traffic C6urt Conference be held during the summer
of 1954 in various parts of the state.
2. That serious consideration be given by cities of Colorado
in adopting the Uniform Traffic Ticket and the Model Traffic
Ordinance.
3. That the statute relating to mandatory revocation of
driver's license be amended to permit discretion to be exercised
by the State Motor Vehicle Department after considering the recommendation of the judge in cases of first final conviction while
driving under the influence of intoxicating liquors.
4. That traffic violators' schools be established by municipal
and justice courts wherever possible.
5. That local school boards and their superintendents make
traffic safety education courses compulsory in all secondary schools
throughout the State of Colorado.
6. That a guide be prepared to assist judges and magistrates
to more uniformly assess traffic fines and penalties.
7. That the Traffic Court Conference favored legislation by
the General Assembly limiting the jury in the county court appeals
from municipal courts to passing only on the question of guilt
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or innocence, reserving to the trial judge the imposition of the
penalty in the event of conviction.
8. That the fee system of paying justices of the peace be
abolished, and that a salary be substituted therefor in an amount
commensurate with the duties and responsibilities of the office
and comparable to the earnings of those in business and industry
who bear like responsibilities.
9. That the tenure of office of justices of the peace be four
years.
10. That the state legislature revise and amend the statutes
relating to justice of the peace fees to the end that a flat fee shall
remain in all cases of like nature filed in justice courts throughout
the state.
The success of the regional conferences will depend on the
number of participants and the divergent groups represented. All
lawyers and members of the bar association will be invited to
attend and participate. Audience participation is encouraged, and
portions of time at the end of each panel will be set aside for
discussion and questions from the audience. The lawyers of the
state can be of great service to their community and to their profession by attending these regional conferences and giving those
in attendance the benefit of their experience and knowledge. Each
attorney has an obligation to attend the conference and help bring
about the needed changes in our traffic court system. The lawyer
knows best of all what improvements must be made, particularly
the lawyer who practices in and around his own community, for
it is the attorney, who in trying to represent his client meets the
deficiencies and laxities which detract from the successful administration of justice through the traffic courts of our state. The
general public, the law enforcement agencies, the judges and the
attorneys of this state cannot help but prosper from these conferences.

THE JOLLY TESTATOR WHO MAKES HIS OWN WILL
Ye lawyers who live upon litigants' fees,
And who need a good many to live at your ease;
Grave or gay, wise or witty, whate'er your degree,
Plain stuff or State's Counsel, take counsel of me:
When a festive occasion your spirit unbends,
You should never forget the profession's best friends;
So we'll send round the wine, and a light bumper fill
To the jolly testator who makes his own will.
-Lord

Neaves (c. 1865)
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A BRIEF LOOK AT RECRIMINATION
MYRON M. MILLER*
*Student, University of Denver College of Law

The equitable rule that one who invokes the aid of the court
must come into it with a clear conscience and with clean hands
has been applied by the courts in divorce proceedings and has
formed the basis for the doctrine of recrimination. It is now well
established in this country under this doctrine, that the defendant
to an action of divorce may set up as a defense in bar that the
plaintiff was guilty of misconduct which in itself is a ground for
divorce. It is not necessary that the plaintiff's misconduct be the
same or of the same degree as that alleged misconduct of the
defendant's; but by the weight of authority, when divorce statutes
specify certain acts of misconduct which will provide grounds for
absolute divorce, any one is good as a bar-a recriminatory defense-regardless of a moral point of view. The misconduct must
have been committed by the plaintiff knowingly and without connivance, justification, or excuse. Therefore, knowing that he who
seeks redress for a violation of a contract based on mutual and
dependent covenants must himself have performed the obligation
on his part, what has been the progress and application of this
principle in Colorado?
RECRIMINATION IN COLORADO

The statutory law is set out in the 1935

COLO. STAT. ANN., C.
56, §7, entitled "Cross-complaint-Both parties guilty-Divorce
denied-" as follows:

In any action for divorce the defendant may file a
cross-complaint in which may be set forth any one or
more causes for divorce or separate maintenance against
the plaintiff; and if upon the trial of such action both
parties shall be found guilty of any one or more of the
causes of divorce, then divorce shall not be granted to
either of said parties.
The statute has not been amended, and this is the statutory law
in Colorado today, as far as recrimination is concerned. The statute specifically says that the parties may be found guilty of "any"
ground for divorce, and Colorado has followed this line of application from as far back as 1892 as evidenced by the case of Reddington v. Reddington.1
In that case the defendant was guilty of desertion and nonsupport, and the. plaintiff guilty of adultery; it was held that both
the complaint and the cross-complaint should have been dismissed.
The court in its opinion stated, "In estimation of law, all grounds
of divorce are of equal force and validity, notwithstanding supposed differences in point of morals, and in the gravity of the
12 Colo. App. 8, 29 P. 811 (1892).
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offenses involved." From this opinion we can conclude that Colorado is in accord with the weight of authority as mentioned ante,
in that the offenses of the plaintiff and the defendant need not be
the same.
Courts May Sua Sponte Declare Recriminationand Deny Divorce
A first suggestion of the court's power to deny divorce on
the grounds of recrimination when the defendant has not set up
the plaintiff's misconduct as either a bar or a cross-complaint,
appeared in the opinion of the case of Ward v. Ward.2 Here the
court said where the trial develops facts which would make the
granting of a divorce inequitable or unjust, the court has a duty
to see to it that a decree of divorce is denied. This inference became the rule rather than remaining a suggestion in the case of
Garver v. Garver.3 The court stated as follows: "If upon the
testimony presented, the wife applying for the divorce appears
to have been herself guilty of willful desertion, it is the duty of
the court, upon its own motion to deny her application." Because
of this case, the rule seems to be settled that in Colorado the court
can deny divorce and claim recrimination on its motion.
Effect of Recrimination on Alimony
In the case of Cupples v. Cupples,4 the wife sued for separate
maintenance. The husband-defendant set up a recriminatory defense, but did not seek a divorce. The court held that (1) the
defendant could set up a recriminatory defense and did not have
to seek a divorce and (2) the fact that the defendant had established facts which would entitle him to a divorce was not sufficient
reason for the disallowance of alimony. However, the case of
Elliott v. Elliott,5 decided shortly after the Cupples case, supra,
and in effect seems to change the Cupples ruling, states the apparent prevailing rule in Colorado as follows: "If by reason of misconduct of both parties neither was entitled to a divorce, and the
complaint was dismissed as to the divorce, it is error for the court
to decree alimony and separate maintenance to the plaintiff, the
action should have been dismissed." The Elliott case leaves the
writer with the impression that Colorado extends the "clean hands"
doctrine to alimony, and before a party can seek alimony the party
desiring the court's aid must come into the court with clean hands.
Another sidelight may be noted here from a 1916 Colorado
case 6 which points out that failure by a defendant to a divorce
action to comply with an order granting the plaintiff temporary
alimony and suit money is not sufficient ground to prevent the
defendant from making his defense of recrimination, or any defense he has, as it would then be depriving the defendant of his
225 Colo. 33, 52 P. 1105 (1898).

'52 Colo. 227, 121 P. 165 (1912).
431 Colo. 443, 72 P. 1056 (1903).
534 Colo. 298, 83 P. 630 (1905).
6Frey v. Frey, 61 Colo. 581, 158 P. 714 (1916).
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constitutional right to be heard before being deprived of his
property or personal rights.
Miscellaneous Notes As to Recrimination
The case of Sholes v. Sholes I states that where a wife sues
for divorce on grounds of mental cruelty and is denied divorce
because of recrimination, she is also denied separate maintenance
in a subsequent action using the same acts of cruelty during the
same period of time, since it has been judicially determined that
the charge of cruelty was not sustained, there was left no basis
for a suit of separate maintenance.
The case of Harms v. Harms 8 points out that where a divorce
action is brought by a resident of the state of the forum against
a non-resident, a divorce may be granted the non-resident upon
his or her cross petition, in spite of the fact that the statute requires the plaintiff in an action for divorce to have been a resident for a specified time. The defendant, in such a case, need not
plead statutory residence and is not limited by the statute concerning acts of cruelty committed within the state of Colorado,
but would be free to establish cruelty committed subsequent to
the marriage no matter where committed.
It should also be noted that condoned adultery is not a bar
to a divorce, because it is not a ground for divorceY
RECRIMINATION AND ITS APPLICATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Thirty-two jurisdictions have recrimination statutes. Of these
32 jurisdictions, 29 provide for recrimination as an absolute defense, while 3 give the court the power to use its discretion for
the final determination of the effect of the complainant's misconduct.
Doctrine of Comparative Rectitude
The doctrine of comparative rectitude has been defined as
the principle that, under proper circumstances, relief by way of
divorce may be given to the party least at fault, although both
parties have shown ground for divorce. 10 The courts adopting
this doctrine seem to apply it in cases where it appears that the
parties cannot possibly live together again, the idea being that
it is not only for the parties' welfare but for the general welfare
of society as well. It has also been suggested that the mere fact
that both parties are at fault and desirous of a divorce, is sufficient reason for granting divorce.
The Ohio court I" in repudiating comparative rectitude stated,
"A court cannot find both parties guilty of acts of misconduct
constituting a ground for divorce and then grant a divorce to the
party the less guilty of the two. One party must be guilty and
the other innocent of acts constituting a ground for divorce, before
72 Colo. 175, 209 P. 1046 (1922).
'120 Colo. 212, 209 P. 2d 522 (1949).
'Jones v. Jones, 71 Colo. 420, 207 P. 596 (1922).
10159 A.L.R. 734.
,1Veler v. Veler, 57 Ohio 155, 12 N.E. 2d 783.
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a court can enter a decree." While the Michigan court 12 stated,
"The scales of equity cannot be adjusted to measure degrees of
culpability between erring spouses."
Same Offense Doctrine
Those following this doctrine advocate that no divorce may
be decreed to the complainant if he is guilty of the same offense
charged against the defendant. This doctrine departs from the
general rule that a recriminatory offense need not be of the same
nature as the offense of which the defendant is guilty, and states
that the defendant can only set up as a recriminatory defense the
same offense the plaintiff has charged him with. This doctrine is
expressly followed by the Texas courts 13 in their holdings that
the misconduct of the plaintiff, in order to constitute a defense
to the suit, must, even if sufficient to give the defendant cause for
divorce upon the assumption of his entire innocence, be of the
same general character and degree as the misconduct of the defendant relied on by the plaintiff as ground of suit, and must have
been provocatory of the defendant's acts of misconduct.
By use of this doctrine, the doctrine of recrimination is
greatly cut down as to its extensive application, and the complainant also has a much greater chance of obtaining a divorce.
In effect, the same offense doctrine is an extension of the doctrine
of comparative rectitude, and they both enjoy little popularity.
Statutes Allowing the Court to Use Its Discretion
Some states have seen the ills of recrimination in that the
court forces the erring spouses to continue the marriage contractit leaves the parties where it found them, when they both have
dirty hands-and these states have passed statutes which grant
to the trial court the authority to exercise its discretion as to the
granting or denying of a divorce when the parties appear to be
in equal wrong. Such jurisdictions as Kansas, 14 Minnesota, 15 Oklahoma,1 6 and Wyoming 17 have deemed it proper to give their courts
such discretionary powers.
Types of Statutes 18
There are 8 types of statutes in the 32 jurisdictions following
recrimination which are as follows: (where the defendant is
guilty of . .
the defendant can recriminate by showing the
plaintiff guilty of . . ).
Adultery-adultery (15); any cause-any cause (6); any
12Vardon v. Vardon, 266 Mich. 341, 253 N.W. 320.
"a
Hale v. Hale, 26 Am. Rep. 294: Trigg v. Trigg, 18 S. W. 313.
' Larsen v. Larsen, 134 Kans. 436, 7 P. 2d 120; Roberts v. Roberts, 103 Kans.
65, 173 P. 536.
Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff, 144 F. 2d 509, 79 App. D. C. 153.
"Panther v. Panther, 147 Okla. 131, 295 P. 219; Lyon v. Lyon, 39 0kla. 111,
134 P. 650.
" Jegendorf v. Jegendorf, 61 Wyo. 277, 157 P. 2d 280.
lbVernier Family Lawq, 1932.
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cause-same crime or misconduct (3) ; any cause-cause of equal
wrong (2) ; any cause-adultery (3) ; adultery-any cause (1);
any cause-adultery or like cause (1) ; desertion, cruelty, adultery,
intoxication-like conduct (1).
THE PROS AND CONS OF RECRIMINATION

After this brief look at recrimination and its by-product doctrines the question still remains as to what would be a suitable
solution. Should some of these doctrines such as comparative
rectitude or the same offense doctrine be adopted, or should the
recrimination provision be excluded from our statutes, or shall
we call the existing statute satisfactory for our needs and let it
remain as it is? Needless to say, the state of the divorce laws is
quite controversial and many opinions exist as to their ultimate
fate.
Those advocating that recrimination doctrines and applications should be strictly construed and adhered to use an argument
which is fairly well summed up by the Colorado court in a 1905
case 11'which states as follows:
The complainant must come with clean hands and a
chaste character not stained with the infamy and crime
of which she complains. 1he parties are in pari delicto,
and to grant relief to either of them would be offering a
bounty to guilt. It would place the permanency of the
marriage contract, in every case, at the disposal of the
contracting parties, and remove one of the strongest motives to that correctness and chastity of conduct which is
necessary to render the marriage state either pleasant
or convenient.
This is a fairly accurate statement of the general argument set
forth by those beating the drum for recrimination. In other words,
what they are saying is that the law deems the party seeking a
divorce to be innocent. If under the statute the parties to the
marriage-and sadly enough to the divorce-are in pari delicto,
how can the courts decide which is the innocent and which the
injured party? And going a step farther they ask, can either have
the contract vacated at the expense of the other, when it has been
equally infracted by both? Therefore these advocates believe the
rule should be to allow the defendant to recriminate for any of
the causes which would dissolve the contract, whether it be codem
delictum or not.
On the other side of the fence we find those who believe that
something should be done about recrimination, and a good summary of their arguments in support of relaxation of the doctrine
of recrimination appeared in the K. C. Law Reviewo2 0 which states,
I"Elliott v. Elliott, 34 Colo. 298, 83 P. 630 (1905).
20Vol. 10 K. C. Law Review 249,50.
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Denial of divorce seldom restores life to families
sociologically dead when they came into court, and that
if anything is preserved it is but the dead and empty shell
of what has been and is no longer a realization, that upon
the refusal of divorce, those things which cannot be done
legally are often done illegally, relationships are formed,
nameless children are born, and that even if the parties
forces themselves to remain together, their children will
probably not thank them for it or even be imbued with
any high and lasting ideals about their family, or the
family as a sociological concept. If this is the justification
for permitting divorce where only one party is at fault,
how much more reasonable is it to permit divorce where
both parties hold their marriage vows in contempt, and
the likelihood that attempts at reconcilliation will fail
are thereby doubled. Possibly at one time-when a party
convicted of adultery was prohibited from marrying again
-a distinction could be made. But if so, it is no longer
valid today. With a few limitations, the defendant as
well as the successful petitioner is permitted to remarry
and possibly achieve the happiness he failed to find in
his first marriage.
These arguments are sound, for it seems that the parties to a
divorce action differ from those in the ordinary civil action. In
the divorce action the judge protects the state's interest in an
orderly society, the interest of the citizens, and above all the court
should protect the welfare of the children who might be affected
by divorce proceedings. Therefore a strict application of the clean
hands doctrine is nothing more than a form of punishment dealt
to the erring spouses, and omits consideration of the interests of
those who are no more than innocent bystanders but who are nevertheless dealt misery because they are adversely affected by a decree which leaves both the guilty litigants where the court found
them-and in the situation where they placed themselves. To
compel two persons who both seek divorce to live together seems
to be a moral injustice, for divorce itself is the climax-it is a
word describing shattered domestic harmony and affection which
has been replaced by discord and strong hatred.
Therefore the choice which we are left with is (1) a dissolution of the existing marriage with the possibility of future happiness and respectability through remarriage or (2) continuing the
existing marriage and harboring a pretended legal cohabitation
which in all probability will result in promiscuity by both parties
to satisfy passions and quell emotions. It seems to the writer that
there is only one available choice-that is the first-because this
choice best meets the needs of our present-day society. The problem exists and the question remains what shall we do about it?
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CONVENTION RESERVATIONS
There was an old woman who lived in a shoe. She had so
many lawyers she didn't know what to do. That, in a word, expresses the problem that has multiplied the grey hairs in the heads
of Colorado Bar Association Presidents of recent years and has
driven to near distraction the kindly and courteous managers of
the Broadmoor Hotel. A special committee was appointed to solve
the problem of reservations and assignment of rooms at the Broadmoor Hotel at the convention to be held next October.
It is an unfortunate fact that in recent years far more requests
for reservations have been received by the Broadmoor than could
be, filled. The annual convention has attained a popularity and importance to the members of the Colorado Bar Association which
is most gratifying but which has led to a highly competitive scramble for rooms at the Broadmoor. A study of the records of the
past two or three conventions indicates, however, that much of
this competition is of the toe-in-the-door category and a great many
of the reservations made at the time of the announcement of the
convention dates have been cancelled at the last minute. It is thus
apparent that many reservations are being made by members
simply on the chance that they may attend the convention but
without any definite plan on their part to do so.
The 56th Annual Convention of the Colorado Bar Association
will be held on October 14 to 17, 1954, at the Broadmoor Hotel in
Colorado Springs. The following procedures will be strictly observed in the handling of reservations for this convention:
1. All requests for reservations must be sent to the Secretary
of the Colorado Bar Association, 702 Midland Savings Building
in Denver instead of to the Broadmoor Hotel.
2. No block reservations will be recognized but each member
of the Association desiring reservations must send in his own request by United States mail.
3. Each reservation request must be accompanied with a
deposit of $15.00. This deposit will not be credited to the hotel bill
(the Broadmoor has a policy against accepting advances on room
rent) but will cover a registration fee of $6.00 and pay for one
ticket each to the Friday and Saturday Luncheons ($2.50 each),
the Saturday night Banquet ($4.00), the President's Reception,
the Friday night entertainment and the Grand Ball on Saturday
night.
4. On March 1, 1954, all requests for reservations then in the
Secretary's office will be opened simultaneously. If the total number of requests accompanied by a proper deposit does not exceed
the number of rooms which the Broadmoor can make available,
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all will be filled. If such requests exceed the number of rooms
available, the rooms will be allocated to the various local Bar
Associations, pro-rated according to the membership of each Association. Associations having more requests for reservations than
rooms assigned may select by lot or otherwise the registrants to
be approved. Such selection would be made by the local Bar Association involved with the results certified to the Secretary of the
Colorado Bar Association.
5. Letters requesting reservations will be sent by the secretary
to the Broadmoor Hotel when approved in the above manner. The
hotel will be responsible for the actual assignment of rooms.
6. Deposits will be returned to those not receiving reservations
unless they desire to leave their request on file in the hope of obtaining a reservation cancelled by another. Those leaving their deposit
with the Bar Association Secretary will receive preference in the
assignment of cancelled reservations.
7. After a reservation is confirmed NO DEPOSIT WILL BE
RETURNED UNLESS A CANCELLATION IS RECEIVED
PRIOR TO SEPTEMBER 14, 1954.
If this all sounds like a bookie's nightmare, please remember
that it is the only solution the Committee has been able to devise
which will minimize the possibility of discrimination and which will
give each member of the Colorado Bar Association an equal chance
at a reservaton.
Requests for accommodations at the Broadmoor Hotel will now
be received by the Bar Association Secretary.
No advance deposit will be required of members who do not
request reservations at the Broadmoor Hotel. Ample accommodations are available elsewhere in Colorado Springs and the Secretary will assist anyone desiring such facilities.
SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR CONVENTION
RESERVATIONS,
PETER H. HOLME, JR.,
JACOB S. SCHEY,
RAPHAEL J. MOSES.

Your contribution to the Colorado Bar Foundation today will promote the administration of justice in Colorado and the standards of
learning in your profession for generations to come. The corpus of
funds which the Foundation acquires cannot be invaded.
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CASE COMMENTS

I

DOMESTIC RELATIONS: RECOVERY BY CHILD FOR
LOSS OF MOTHER'S COMPANIONSHIP-An interesting decision to lawyers concerned with domestic relations law has just
been rendered by the U. S. District Court for the District of
Columbia. In Hill v. Sibley Memorial Hospital,' Justice Youngdahl
granted a motion to dismiss count two of a complaint in which a
minor sought to recover damages for loss of her mother's "comfort,
aid, kindness and assistance" due to the alleged negligence of the
defendant. The opinion does not state the facts of the case.
This decision does not change the law as lawyers have always
understood it; it merely clarifies a point which is seldom litigated.
It is the fourth reported case in which a child has sought to recover for loss of his parent's consortium." However, it differs
from the other three cases in that they were in the nature of
"alienation of affections" suits.
In McMillan v. Taylor 2 and Elder v. MacAlpine-Downie 3 the
children were suing defendants who had allegedly enticed their
parent away from their homes. Both were decided by the U. S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The first case was
dismissed on the ground that a cause of action did not exist for
enticing a parent away from his or her spouse, thereby destroying
the home and depriving the children of their parent's comfort, love
and affection.
In the second case the court held an infant has no cause of
action for alleged deprivation of family life to which he was
naturally entitled against a woman who allegedly wrongfully enticed the infant's father from his home and induced him to desert
the infant and mother. The suit for $50,000 was dismissed for
failure to state a cause of action upon which relief could be granted.
In the principal case, the court refuses to follow the decision
of Daily v. Parker4 in which the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals
held that children may maintain an action for damages for being
deprived of the support, guidance and protection of their father
against a woman who has luded him away from his family.
Justice Youngdahl recognized a difference between an action
for alienation of affections and one for negligence, but he dismissed the action because:
A lower court should be cautious in laying down a
completely new rule in the light of prior holdings of our
1108 F.
F.
'180 F.
152 F.

2160

Supp. 739 (1952).
2d 221 (1946).
2d 385 (1950).
2d 174 (7th Cir.) 162 ALR 819 (1945).
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Court of Appeals indicating hestitancy to extend the right
of recovery of damages for such loss to a child. If there
is to be a change in that doctrine, this court does not feel
that it should be the one to initiate it.
In evaluating this decision it is necessary to determine what
consortium is. Although some courts say that it consists primarily
of services, the majority hold that the husband can recover even
where there is no loss of services.
In Lane v. Dunning 5 the court said:
The husband's right of action for damages for loss of
consortium does not rest upon the ground of loss of service, but upon the loss of society or consortium arising by
virtue of the marriage contract.
In Guevin v. Manchester St. Ry. 6 the court defined consortium
as "service, society, comfort and the sexual rights."
It seems to be well settled that the husband's action for negligent injury to the consortium was not dependent (at common law) upon his proving loss of service, that any substantial injury to martial rights is actionable.
Where the wife's right to consortium has been interfered with
by a negligent injury to the husband, the general rule is that she
has no remedy.7 if the injury is intentional or malicious she can
recover against the tortfeasor. There is however a federal case,
Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., s holding to the contrary in which the
husband was injured during the course of his employment, and
his wife sued his employer for loss of consortium after he had recovered under a Workmen's Compensation act. The Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia allowed recovery and
pointed out why the law should protect the wife as well as the
husband. In a forceful opinion Judge Clark writes:
We can conceive of no reasons for denying this right
for the reason that in this enlightened day and age, they
simply do not exist... The husband owes the same degree
of love, affection, felicity, etc. to the wife as she to him
.. It would be a judicial fiat for us to say that a wife may
not have an action for loss of consortium due to negligence.
There can be no doubt that the expressed view of
this court is that the husband and wife have equal rights
in the marriage relation which will receive equal protec'186 Ky. 797; 218 S. W. 269 (1920).
'78 N. H. 289; 99 Atl. 298; LRA 1917 c410 (1916).
'Giggey v. Gallagher Transportation Co., 101 Colo. 258; 72 P. 2d 1100 (1937).
8187 F. 2d 811; 23 ALR 2d 1366 (1950).
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tion of the law. That these rights existed prior to the passage of the Married Women's act cannot be doubted. The
act simply removed the wife's disability to invoke the
law's protection.
Assuming that companionship is the primary element of consortium, why should not a wife or child be allowed recovery for
loss of it? Certainly, the love and affection which a wife owes to
her husband is no more valuable than that which a husband owes
to his wife or a parent to his child. When the companionship of
family life is invaded, should not the law protect both spouses in a
like manner?
The objection to extending recovery is that an action by every
member of the family could result. To overcome this objection,
one action could be provided for, to be brought by the spouse for
himself or herself and for the children. If the mother or father
did not sue within a certain period, then the children should be
allowed to bring the action.
The court's reluctance to extend recovery to children for loss
of love and affection is understandable, but perhaps the time has
come for a reappraisal of the validity of the law on consortium.
DOLORES KoPLOWITZ

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
The President's Conference on Administrative Procedure announced that its Committee on Hearing Officers will study the
status of federal hearing officers.
Mr. Earl Kintner, General Counsel of the Federal Trade Commission, is chairman of this committee. Mr. Kintner said his
committee will analyze the controversy which surrounds the administration of hearing officers under the Administrative Procedure Act. His committee will approach all facets of the problem
including the qualifications, recruitment, selection, administration,
tenure, removal, compensation and promotion of hearing officers.
The committee will seek information both in writing and by
hearings. All interested persons and organizations are invited to
present their views. The Cc-mmittee has prepared an outline on
the subject which may be obtained by writing to:
Committee on Hearing Officers,
President's Conference on Administrative Procedure,
Room 576, Federal Trade Commission Building,
Washington 25, D. C.

PAGE SENATOR MCCARTHY
Is this some more subtle Communist propaganda? A. L. Vogl
of Denver calls to our attention the fact that the title to Vol. 16,
American Jurisprudence reads: "Death to Diplomatic Officers."
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